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Austro-German Liberalism 
and the Modern Liberal Tradition 
Harry Ritter 
Western Washington University 
Der Liberalismus ist aus, eine neue Zeit bricht an, Platz fur 
uns! 
Hermann Bahr, 1882 
Die Welt will heute vom Liberalismus nichts mehr wissen. 
Ausserhalb Englands ist die Bezeichnung 'Liberalismus' 
geradezu geachtet. 
Ludwig von Mises, 1927 
Modes of historical interpretation change . . . the past grows 
with the present. Historians view past and present in some sort 
of simultaneous vision. Some of them believe that an informed 
picture of the past may shed some light on the unfolding future 
- or at least they know that a mythical past ill instructs the 
present. 
Fritz Stern, The Failure of Illiberalism 
In a widely-cited essay on turn-of-the century Vienna, Carl 
Schorske alludes to the"dissolution of the classical liberal view of 
man in the crucible of Austria's modern politics .... [and] the 
emergence of psychological man from the wreckage of the old 
culture."' The theme of liberal decline has provided Schorske with 
the backdrop for several important articles on late nineteenth- 
century Austria, and a number of interesting monographs on 
1. Carl E. Schorske, "Politics and the Psyche in fin de siecle Vienna: Schnitzler 
and Hofmannsthal," The American Historical Review, 66 (July 1961): 946. 
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related topics have also recently appeared.2 Relatively few 
historical studies, however, address the subject of Austrian 
liberalism per se,3 and those which do are mostly broad surveys.4 
2. Schorske's essays are collected in Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture 
(New York, 1980). Related works include William J. McGrath, Dionysian Art and 
Populist Politics in Austria (New Haven, Conn., 1974); Andrew G. Whiteside, The 
Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schonerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism 
(Berkeley, 1975); and John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: 
Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago, 1981). 
3. Even native Austrian historians have paid scant attention to the subject for 
its own sake. This is partially explained by the fact that, from the late nineteenth 
century to the 1950s, the philosophical faculties of Austrian universities were often 
hostile to liberalism, and the leading early historians of the movement - e.g., 
Friedjung, Kolmer, Charmatz - worked primarily as journalists and freelance 
authors. The fact that Richard Charmatz, once called by Fritz Fellner the "real 
historian of Austrian liberalism" ("Richard Charmatz: Biograph Osterreichs," 
Forum [March 1965]: 113-114), is usually either forgotten completely or dismissed as a 
mere "publicist" is just one measure of the extent to which the subject has been 
deemed insignificant. To be sure, histories of nineteenth-century Austria 
customarily concede that certain ministers (Bruck, Koerber, Bohm-Bawerk, etc.) 
were strongly influenced by liberal ideas, that rentiers and the banking, 
commercial, and manufacturing community were sympathetic to liberalism, and 
that the press - above all, the Neue Freie Presse and the Neues Wiener Tagblatt - 
was a liberal influence. But, having mentioned this in passing, Austrian historians 
normally proceed to what they regard as the genuinely important topics: 
nationalism, socialism, constitutional reform, the role of the Jews, etc. 
4. Among the indispensable works: Richard Charmatz, Deutsch- 
Osterreichische Politik: Studien uber den Liberalismus und iiber die auswirtige 
Politik Osterreichs (Leipzig, 1907), by an early twentieth century proponent of "neo- 
liberal" regeneration who laid bare the flaws of the "old liberalism" in classic 
fashion - still the "best account of the development of the 'liberal' party groupings 
and factions of the Reichsrat" (Karl Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat? Der 
publizistische und politische Kampf der 6sterreichischen Liberalen um die 
Religionsgesetze des Jahres 1868 [Vienna, 1978], p. 16); Georg Franz, Liberalismus: 
die deutschliberale Bewegung in der habsburgischen Monarchie (Munich, 1955), 
sympathetic to the liberals, but vitiated by the tone of self-pity and "tragedy" 
characteristic of national liberalism in the tradition of classic liberal historiography 
a la Friedjung, as well as antipathy to the alleged atomistic individualism of western 
Europe; Karl Eder, Der Liberalismus in Altbsterreich: Geisteshaltung, Politik, 
Kultur (Vienna, 1955), written by a priest, unsympathetic to liberalism; Albert 
Fuchs, Geistige Strbmungen in Osterreich 1867-1918 (Vienna, 1949), written with 
engaging naivete and humanity, though Fuchs was a Marxist with a compulsion to 
interpret absolutely everything in simplistic terms of class-bound ideology; Eduard 
Winter, Romantismus, Restauration, und Friihliberalismus im osterreichischen 
Vormdrz (Vienna, 1968) and Revolution, Neoabsolutismus und Liberalismus in der 
Donaumonarchie (Vienna, 1969), couched in the mock epic tone of an "ordeal" of 
liberal Catholicism in the Vormarz, with the philosopher Bolzano as martyr. Like 
the surveys of Franz, Eder, and Fuchs, Winter's books are primarily studies in 
traditional Geistesgeschichte. Diethild Harrington-Miiller, Der Fortschrittsklub im 
Abgeordnetenhaus des osterreichischen Reichsrat 1873-1910 (Vienna, 1972), surveys 
228 
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Aside from these general studies, our detailed knowledge of the 
subject - such as it is - rests on scattered articles, chapters or 
segments of chapters in general histories and monographs, and a 
handful of Austrian disserations.5 
In this essay I propose to broadly evaluate the existing 
literature on Austrian liberalism, and to advocate, as well, some 
new directions for research; in the process I will frequently address 
the question of current scholarship on liberalism in general, and 
occasionally touch on the situation with regard to regions other 
than Austria, particularly Germany and Britain. My remarks will 
deal more with ways historians have thought about liberalism and 
might think about liberalism than with liberalism itself. It is no 
doubt preferable, as someone has said, to supply one concrete 
answer than a host of proposals for further research; the fact 
remains that the important subject of Austro-German liberalism 
has hitherto been on the periphery of historians' research agenda. 
In this case, a reconsideration of conventional generalizations 
would seem to repay the effort. 
It is not difficult to see why the subject of liberalism in Austria 
has been neglected. It is a fact, after all, that proponents of 
liberalism in Austria never succeeded in defining their aims in a 
the history of the liberal party coalitions in the Cisleithanian parliament. The 
scholarly and popular essays of Adam Wandruszka must also be noted, especially 
"Osterreichs politische Struktur," in Heinrich Benedikt, ed., Geschichte der 
Republik Osterreich (Vienna, 1954). Wandruszka has been very important for 
establishing a widely-accepted sense of liberalism's place in the sweep of modern 
Austrian political history. His conception of a dialectical conflict between liberalism 
and its "post-liberal" antitheses - nationalism, socialism, and Christian socialism - 
has been so thoroughly assimilated over the past twenty-five years that his work is 
often no longer specifically cited. His essay on "Osterreichs politische Struktur" is an 
impressive synthesis - possibly the key source in the contemporary network of 
literature about modern Austrian politics - but too many historians have accepted 
it uncritically as the final word on liberalism. 
5. It should be said that a number of recent monographs which focus on 
subjects other than liberalism contain much valuable information on liberalism 
itself - e.g., Heinrich Lutz, Osterreich-Ungarn und die Griindung des deutschen 
Reiches. Europdische Entscheidungen 1867-1871 (Frankfurt, 1978), and Harm- 
Hinrich Brandt, Der Osterreichische Neoabsolutismus. Staatsfinanzen und Politik 
1848-1860, 2 vols. (G6ttingen, 1978). This scattered information needs to be gathered 
and synthesized. One should also note the appearance of two important articles on 
the conceptual history of liberalism in Rudolf Vierhaus, "Liberalismus" and Rudolf 
Walther, "Exkurs: Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, 
and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon 
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1982), vol. 3: pp. 741-785, 
787-815. 
229 
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way which appealed to the broad public,6 and that organized 
liberalism enjoyed only a fleeting taste of parliamentary leadership 
- based on a severely limited franchise - in the 1860s and 1870s. On 
these grounds alone, it is perhaps not surprising that Austrian 
liberalism should often be overlooked, or dismissed as a historical 
curio and political dead end. Moreover, for obvious reasons the 
focus of attention in central European studies in recent years has 
been on National Socialism and its origins in late nineteenth- 
century radicalism and "cultural pessimism"; there has been little 
incentive for either senior or apprentice historians to study a 
movement such as liberalism, whose values are widely alleged to 
have been overwhelmed and transcended in the early twentieth 
century. John W. Boyer's new study of Viennese Christian 
Socialism, cited above, deals extensively with liberalism and 
constitutes in some respects an important advance over previous 
literature, insofar as it takes seriously some of liberalism's positive 
achievements. Still, even here liberalism is not given center stage, 
but functions as a foil for "radicalism." 
In German history the situation is now improving (see note 17), 
although until quite recently interest in liberalism was chiefly 
peripheral, largely confined to charting the reasons for the 
doctrine's inability to arrest aggressive nationalism, imperialism, 
political irrationalism, and totalitarianism.7 Indeed, the entire 
6. Franz, Liberalismus, p. 239, speaks of the liberals' "theoretical confusion" 
and striking "lack of political effectiveness." A standard reason given for neglecting 
the subject is that organized political liberalism never progressed beyond the level of 
an individualistic Honoratiorenpartei to produce a disciplined "mass party" (e.g., 
Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 94). If one's focus is primarily on the 
evolution and success of political parties, it is likely that the nineteenth-century 
liberal movement - identified with the Verfassungspartei and its fragmented 
successors - will be interesting, at best, only as a precursor of subsequent 
developments. Here again, Wandruszka's work has been crucial in establishing the 
broad frame of reference, even for those not narrowly concerned with party or 
political history such as Schorske. 
7. See, e.g., most of the essays in Karl Holl and Gunter List, eds., Liberalismus 
und imperialistischer Staat: Der Imperialismus als Problem liberaler Parteien in 
Deutschland 1890-1914 (Gottingen, 1975). An exception is Hans-Gunter Zmarzlik's 
"Das Kaiserreich als Einbahstrasse?" pp. 62-71. Not infrequently liberalism is itself 
made to bear a heavy burden of guilt for the rise of twentieth-century tyranny - and 
it is not the Marxists alone who tar liberalism with the brush of embryonic 
"fascism." For an interpretation strongly influenced by East German scholarship 
see Walter Struve, Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois 
Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933 (Princeton, 1973); a recent non-Marxist 
example is James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century 
(Chicago, 1978), pp. 273, 276-278, 281-282. There is wide agreement on German 
230 
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intellectual climate in recent decades has been fundamentally 
unfavorable to the study of liberalism - whether it be the Austrian 
species, the American, or any other variety - simply because the 
notion that liberalism "died" on the eve of World War I and the idea 
that its values are "bankrupt" today have become so remarkably 
widespread and uncritically accepted. In many quarters, liberalism 
is now automatically handled with heavy irony as yet another idea 
whose time has come and gone, one whose nineteenth-century 
disciples were either cynical, self-serving hypocrites or, at best, 
confused captives of their own pathetic illusions.8 
And yet, when we shift our eyes away from the printed page, 
the contemporary political and economic scene in western Europe 
and North America testifies at least as much to the liberal 
tradition's vigor as to its decline. Even in the greater part of central 
Europe, a neo-liberal order flourishes today (partially 
masquerading, to be sure, under the name of "social democracy"). 
We must certainly recognize that the establishment of the present 
order was indirectly facilitated by Hitler, who destroyed powerful, 
traditional obstacles to liberalism; that it was introduced under the 
eye of western occupation; and that it was rendered especially 
attractive to the native population by the shadow of Soviet tyranny. 
Still, the fact that it not only exists, but apparently flourishes and 
expands, suggests that it is not merely the product of coercion or 
expediency, and that native traditions may somehow be involved. I 
would like to suggest - while recognizing that theories of liberal as 
well as illiberal Kontiniutdtslinien in central European history run 
liberalism's "failure." Sheehan, for example, cites "liberalism's larger failure to 
shape German politics and society" (p. 177), while Ralf Dahrendorf's widely 
criticized but nonetheless influential Society and Democracy in Germany (New 
York, 1967) is about "Germany's persistent failure to give a home to democracy in its 
liberal sense" (p. 14). 
8. Christopher Lasch's cavalier approach in The Culture of Narcissism: 
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York, 1978), p. xii, is 
fairly typical: "Liberalism, the political theory of the ascendant bourgeoisie, long ago 
lost the capacity to explain events in the world of the welfare state and the 
multinational corporation; nothing has taken its place. Politically bankrupt, 
liberalism is intellectually bankrupt as well." Lasch makes the common but 
erroneous assumption that liberalism should be narrowly equated with laissez-faire 
capitalism. It would not be difficult to compile a long list of quotations written in the 
same sardonic vein; for a sampling of earlier opinion see Max Savelle, "Is Liberalism 
Dead?" in the author's Is Liberalism Dead? and Other Essays (Seattle, 1967), pp. 3-22. 
On the identification of the term "liberalism" with free enterprise economics, a 
surprisingly recent practice which dates only from the turn of the twentieth 
century, see Walther, "Exkurs: Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus," pp. 787, 808-811. 
231 
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the risk of being equally one-sided, anachronistic, and misleading9 
- that the subject of German liberalism in nineteenth-century 
Austria deserves more sympathetic attention than it has hitherto 
received. 
The logical place to begin is with a survey of the broad contours 
of the historiographical field as it stands today. At the most basic 
level, conventional wisdom casts the history of Austrian liberalism 
as a tale of failure. Liberalism was "the one political force ... that 
perpetually lost."10 This general story is typically emplotted 
(deliberately or not) in a number of ways, individually or in various 
combinations:1 more or less sympathetically, as nostalgic elegy, 
poignant melodrama, or melancholy pseudo-tragedy; with 
olympian (often Hegelian) detachment, as a result of a 
transcendental, inexorable process of change and dissolution; or 
self-righteously and satirically - often with a touch of 
Schadenfreude - as a grotesque comedy or farce of "internal 
contradictions," dialectical oppositions, and paradoxes. 
These remarks generally apply to the emplotment of central 
European liberalism as a whole. Several decades ago, when the 
ideals of classical liberalism were taken seriously and the 
individual will was still given generous credit as a force in human 
affairs, bourgeois tragedy - often coupled with the theme of 
"missed opportunities" - was a popular plot form. In this 
literature, a combination of factors - dynastic tradition, 
ecclesiastical obscurantism, aristocratic Engherzigkeit, the 
mistakes and flaws of the liberal leaders - led to liberalism's 
"tragic" failure. The message concerning the "fate" of liberalism 
was typically conveyed through the story of the martyrdom of a few 
far-sighted but isolated heroes - in Austria's case, figures such as 
Admiral Tegetthoff, Adolf Fischhof, to a certain degree Schmerling 
9. Richard J. Evans, "Liberalism and Society: The Feminist Movement and 
Social Change," in Richard J. Evans, ed., Society and Politics in Wilhelmine 
Germany (New York, 1978), p. 204. 
10. Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Garden City, N.Y., 1965), p. 2. 
Stern is speaking here of northern Germany, but his comment applies, with 
qualifications, to the historiography of Austrian liberalism as well. The story of 
liberalism is usually emplotted in much the same way as the larger history of the 
Danubian monarchy itself. Ideas of what was possible for nineteenth-century 
Austrian liberalism are colored by conventional ideas about what was possible for 
the old empire. If we believe that the empire was "destined" to collapse, this is likely 
to affect our approach to liberalism and its "fate." 
11. On the idea of historiographical "emplotment," see Hayden White, 
Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Baltimore, 1973). 
232 
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and, above all, Freiherr von Bruck.12 More recently, the influence 
of political sociology and social psychology has produced 
interpretations which put less stress on individual choices or 
character flaws, and lay more emphasis on impersonal, long-term 
environmental and sociopsychological barriers to the success of 
liberalism. This results in predominantly satiric emplotments of 
the story of central Europe's "long road to modernity" in which 
there are few heroes or martyrs. In the context of the "hard 
realities of German life,"'3 liberalism in central Europe is 
presented as a political fantasy which had no chance for success and 
little practical relationship to the world in which it worked. Here 
the mood is best described as one of ironic satire, only occasionally 
relieved by a note of mild pity. 
Whatever the overall plot form, convention usually demands 
that the Austrian story be divided (explicitly or tacitly) into a three- 
stage scheme of periodization: 1) "early" liberalism 
(Friihliberalismus) - youthful, naive, strongly conditioned by the 
humanitarian ideas of the Aufklarung and Josephinism - which 
dissolves overnight in the sobering revolutionary upheavals of 1848. 
(Three specific varieties of early liberalism are normally identified, 
each with different socioeconomic roots: Hofratsliberalismus, 
stdndisch-aristokratischer Liberalismus, and biirgerlich- 
demokratischer Liberalismus.)14 2) "High" liberalism 
(Hochliberalismus) - prosaic, materialistic, hypocritical, 
frightened of democracy and insensitive to social reform - which 
collapses on the federal level in 1879, with the advent of Taaffe, and 
on the municipal level in the 1890s, with the electoral triumphs of 
Christian Socialism. (A subordinate theme here concerns the 
continuing strain of bureaucratic liberalism, or Hofrats- 
liberalismus, an extension of the eighteenth-century notion of the 
Polizeistaat based on law, though this is often distinguished from 
liberalism proper under the rubric "Josephinism.") 3) "Late" or 
"post" liberalism (Spitliberalismus) - politically sterile and 
senescent, though characterized by the seductive sheen of a third 
generation cultural afterglow. Following this illusory Indian 
summer of Kulturliberalismus, liberalism "dies" sometime before 
1914, largely unnoticed and unmourned. 
12. See, for example, Heinrich Friedjung's Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft 
in Deutschland, 2 vols. (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1897), as well as his Osterreich von 1848 bis 
1860, 2 vols. (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1908-1912); also, Richard Charmatz, Adolf Fischhof 
(Stuttgart/Berlin, 1910) and Minister Freiherr von Bruck (Leipzig, 1916). 
13. Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 187. 
14. Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 15. 
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This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:40:42 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GERMAN STUDIES REVIEW 
This interpretive paradigm rests, in turn, on broad theoretical 
underpinnings provided by a few key studies: e.g., Adam 
Wandruszka's classic analysis of modern Austria's "political 
structure," according to which liberalism was aufgehoben in 
dialectical conflict with its own offspring - Pan-Germanism, 
Socialism, and Christian Socialism - and Hans Rosenberg's 
analysis of central Europe's late nineteenth-century "great 
depression," which undermined the materialistic ethos of the 
Griinderzeit and its wagendes Biirgertum.'5 It is reinforced, as 
well, by generations of serious and popular literary history, 
aesthetic criticism, and Kulturgeschichte which concentrate on 
Vienna's "froliche Apokalypse" and the literature of "fin-de- 
siecle" alienation as the most significant cultural legacy of the late 
Austrian empire. 
This is obviously a simplified overview but not, I think, an 
unfair or inaccurate one. I do not suggest that previous orientations 
are completely false; what we have at present is a very full catalog 
of the weaknesses and deficiencies of nineteenth-century 
liberalism, and they were indeed manifold. I do maintain, however, 
that questionable assumptions and serious gaps in this scholarly 
tradition cause it to tilt much too far in one direction. 
For one thing, the broad question of Austrian liberalism's place 
in the history of modern liberalism as a whole merits closer 
attention and reconsideration. The comparative history of 
nineteenth and twentieth-century liberalism - if we except a few 
older intellectual histories such as that of Ruggiero - is not far 
advanced, for reasons which have already been outlined. The full 
history of how, precisely, Austrian liberalism resembled or differed 
from movements in Britain, France, the United States, etc., is an 
ambitious future project which must await further monographic 
research in the various regional fields. The recent flurry of interest 
among scholars of Britain in turn-of-the-century British neo- 
liberalism provides an important example of the possibilities which 
can open up in an area of study which has long been considered 
exhausted.'6 
15. On Wandruszka, see footnote 4; Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social 
Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in Central Europe," The 
Economic History Review, 13 (1943): 58-73; Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit: 
Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa (Berlin, 1967). 
16. E.g., Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Reform 
(Oxford, 1978); Peter Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971) 
and Liberals and Social Democrats (Cambridge, 1978). For further bibliography on 
recent scholarship regarding British neo-liberalism, see Geoff Eley, "James 
234 
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More to the immediate point is the matter of the comparative 
history of Austrian and north German liberalism.17 For 
understandable reasons, Gesamtdeutsch historiography has been 
out of fashion since 1945; this has meant, unfortunately, that 
developments in Germany have usually been treated in 
unwarranted isolation from those of Austria-Hungary. This seems 
curious in light of the fact that virtually every leading student of 
modern central Europe pays lip service to the importance of an 
appreciation of regional variation in understanding the area's 
history. Were this view taken completely seriously, it would seem 
as important to integrate the stories of the Viennese, Lower and 
Upper Austrian, and Bohemian varieties of German liberalism into 
the general picture, as it would to include those of Baden, Saxony, 
Bavaria, etc. When the problem is approached from a central 
Sheehan and the German Liberals: A Critical Appreciation," Central European 
History 14 (September 1981): 273-288, n. 7. 
17. Perhaps the recent anthology edited by Robert A. Kann and Friedrich E. 
Prinz, Deutschland und Osterreich: Ein bilaterales Geschichtsbuch (Vienna, 1980), 
will encourage further interest in a comparative approach to the history of Germany 
and Austria. In his article "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the 
Nation in German History and Historiography," The Journal of Modern History, 53 
(1981): 1-24, Sheehan has also called for a broader, comparative perspective in 
historical studies of modern German Europe. During the 1970s there was a 
significant revival of interest in liberalism in Wilhelmine Germany, mainly with 
respect to its relationship to social conservatism, imperialism, and the notion of a 
German Sonderweg, or "special course," to modernity. See the very useful 
Bibliographie zum deutschen Liberalismus (Gottingen, 1981), edited with an 
interesting forward by Jiirgen C. Hess and E. van Steensel van der Aa. More 
specifically, in addition to Sheehan's study of German Liberalism and the essays 
edited by Holl and List, cited above, see Thomas Nipperdey, "Wehlers 'Kaiserreich.' 
Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 1(1975): 539-560; 
Hans-Ginter Zmarzlik, "Das Kaiserreich in neuer Sicht?" Historische Zeitschrift, 
222 (1976): 105-126; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Der deutsche Liberalismus zwischen 
'klassenloser Btirgergesellschaft' und 'Organisertem Kapitalismus'. Zu einigen 
neueren Liberalismusinterpretationen," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 4 (1978): 77- 
90; and Lothar Gall, "Der deutsche Liberalismus zwischen Revolution und 
Reischsgrtindung," Historische Zeitschrift, 228 (1979): 98-108. Also relevant are 
Eley's very perceptive "James Sheehan and the German Liberals, " cited above, and 
the review article by Konrad H. Jarausch, "Illiberalism and Beyond: German 
History in Search of a Paradigm," The Journal of Modern History, 55 (June 1983): 
268-284. A central issue in much of this literature, dominated by a spirit of political 
sociology inspired by Marx and Weber and keyed to modernization theory and Walt 
Rostow's "take-off" thesis, is whether to situate the beginning of liberalism's "crisis" 
in the 1850s or the 1880s. John W. Boyer's new study of Political Radicalism in Late 
Imperial Vienna represents one of the first efforts to develop an interpretation of 
late nineteenth-century Austrian politics informed by an acquaintance with the 
concepts and assumptions of the current historiography of Bismarckian and 
Wilhemine Germany. 
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European point of view, one notes a wide range of assumptions, 
issues, and motifs which are common to the historiography of north 
German and German-Austrian liberalism, parallels which may 
have been alluded to impressionistically but which have rarely 
been studied in systematic fashion: the idea, for example, of 
liberalism's "failure" in 1848 - a genuine cliche which few bother 
to question; the chronic condition of Vereinsmeierei, or 
"clubishness," which hindered the development of party discipline; 
the notion that liberals squandered their energies in obsessive 
campaigns against the Catholic Church in the 1860s and 1870s; the 
idea that later challenges to liberalism by Christian Socialism and 
social democracy led to the development of a defensive "seige 
mentality" and a "hardening of attitudes" among liberals. All of 
these thematic parallels - and others, as well - deserve 
systematic, comparative investigation. The differences brought to 
light by this kind of scrutiny will naturally be just as instructive as 
the similarities. 
Also within the comparative context, it would be wise to pay 
more attention to the native eighteenth and early nineteenth- 
century sources of central European liberalism. In Austria's case, 
there is already a swelling literature on Joseph II and the 
"Josephinian" tradition which amply illustrates the ambiguous 
relationship between enlightened Hofratsliberalismus on the one 
hand - with its ideal of the well-tempered bureaucratic 
Rechtsstaat - and liberal individualism and mistrust of the state on 
the other. But this emphasis on Josephinism, important as it is, has 
encouraged neglect of the relationships between Weimar 
classicism, north German philosophy, and liberalism in Austria. 
Despite the strength of Josephinism, and despite all the efforts of 
the Church and the Habsburg restoration to quarantine the 
monarchy from northern influences, north German ideas were 
widely known, discussed, and assimilated by the Austro-German 
intelligentsia and administrative elite in the Vormdrz.'8 The public 
and private discourse of German-Austria - its correspondence, 
diaries, imaginative literature, historiography, political rhetoric, 
etc., - testifies to the fact that Austrian intellectuals and liberal 
politicians worked in essentially the same metaphorical framework 
and with the same eighteenth-century themes as their north 
German counterparts - Bildung, maturation, spiritual freedom, 
etc. The methods of comparative literary criticism and the social 
18. David S. Luft, Robert Musil and the Crisis of European Culture, 1800-1942 
(Berkeley, 1980), p. 7. 
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history of ideas could be profitably applied to the further 
exploration of these relationships. 
A special problem in this regard is presented by the 
conventional notion that the Aufkldrung's introspective approach 
to freedom - the cult of Bildung associated with the Weimar circle 
and Kant - actually constituted a key obstacle to the growth of an 
activist, democratic-liberalism in German Europe and provided a 
convenient smoke-screen for the elitism of Bildung und Besitz.19 
There is much truth in this, and it is not difficult to find Austrian 
cases which fit the pattern; Stifter's famous novel Der 
Nachsommer, for example, has often been read as an archetypical 
case of the approach to freedom as a passive escape or refuge, rather 
than an activist answer to pressing political and social problems. 
Yet one should be wary of dismissing the Bildung tradition out of 
hand, as automatically conducive to political timidity, quietism, or 
ivory tower withdrawal; the eighteenth-century German approach 
to liberty may not have been quite as inherently inimical to 
democratic activism as it is normally made out to be. Classical 
Marxism, for example - in its ideas of class consciousness and 
proletarian revolution - builds directly on the Bildung tradition of 
freedom; the same can be said of revisionist socialism. Moreover, 
most central European democrats - from those of 1848 down to 
Dahrendorf - have drawn powerful inspiration from the 
eighteenth-century tradition. Finally, we should not dismiss out- 
of-hand the importance of the "self-help" approaches associated 
with early reform liberalism in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, which 
were inspired in central Europe largely by the idea of Bildung. It 
should not be forgotten that the "self-help" approach - based on 
the idea of the assimilation of laboring groups to the existing social 
and economic system - conformed to the actual historical 
experience of most liberal leaders. The pattern had always been for 
the talented and ambitious to assimilate to the German elite, and 
this understandably shaped the expectations of early reformers.20 
At the turn of the century, revisionist socialism and reform 
liberalism - both largely inspired by the eighteenth-century 
tradition - showed faint but encouraging signs of merging into a 
democratic, progressive activism. 
Finally, a comparative approach would highlight important 
rhetorical and conceptual problems related to the historiography of 
central European liberalism. The entire issue of the terminology 
19. See, e.g., Sheehan, German Liberalism, pp. 18, 104. 
20. On the wisdom of an old-fashioned "historist" perspective in such matters, 
see Nipperdey, "Wehler's Kaiserreich'," p. 545. 
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used to interpret liberalism, for example, could profit from more 
conscious reflection. The terms and metaphors which control 
present-day discourse about nineteenth-century liberalism are, to 
a great extent, taken over directly from the figurative language of 
pathology invented in some cases, and broadcast by insecure or 
disillusioned turn-of-the-century liberals themselves (as well as by 
renegade progressives whose original liberalism had curdled and 
gone sour). Aside from the very limited use of more sophisticated 
statistical and quantitative methods, contemporary students of 
liberalism have not gone much beyond the left-liberal vocabulary 
of scholarship and journalism associated with such figures as Max 
Weber and Friedrich Naumann in Germany, Heinrich Friedjung, 
Richard Charmatz, and Friedrich Hertz in Austria - men who 
disseminated a language of analysis for the pre-1914 generation. 
The key images and phrases used to explain liberalism today - e. g., 
"paralysis," "decline," "myopia," "bankruptcy," and perhaps the 
most threadbare of the lot, "crisis" - are basically the ones 
introduced before the Great War.21 Obviously, historians cannot 
ignore the imagery and texture of the language used by people they 
study; in the case of liberalism (traditionally associated with self- 
examination and toleration of heretical viewpoints), turn-of-the- 
century liberals were themselves among their own best critics. 
Still, whatever advantages the historian enjoys over the subjects of 
his study he owes largely to refinements of vocabulary, diction, and 
syntax made possible by hindsight. The fact is that historians of 
central Europe have been unimaginative in searching for a fresh 
linguistic framework of analysis to explain nineteenth-century 
liberalism, and often have not been very thoughtful in using the 
language they have inherited. 
Closely associated with the problem of terminology is the 
question of periodization. I have already alluded to the obvious but 
nonetheless frequently ignored pitfalls of mechanically dividing 
"periods" into "early," "high," and "late" phases of development, a 
practice inspired by the analogy of the life cycle with its stages of 
"growth" and "decadence." Despite the current fashion of 
emphasizing "continuity" in central European studies, for 
explanatory purposes most historians continue to rely heavily on 
the practice of packing time into descrete "eras" or "epochs." There 
is genuine irony in the fact that historians of Austria - in stark 
21. These are all taken from Sheehan's German Liberalism, pp. 118, 273,154, 
283, 140. Compare the imagery, for example, of Charmatz's "Die 
Deutschfortschrittlichen," Der Weg (Vienna), 7 October, 1905. 
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contrast to the slight long-range importance they generally 
attribute to liberalism - often refer to the 1860s and 1870s, or even 
to the entire period between 1867 and 1918, as die liberale Ara or das 
liberale Zeitalter.22 This well-worn convention is a legacy of 
Friedjung's generation. In Austrian history, the financial crash of 
1873 is typically depicted as a symbolic event which sounded the 
death knell of the "liberal era." Unquestionably, liberalism as a 
political creed lost much of its elan after the 1870s. Nevertheless, the 
practice of conceptualizing events in terms of self-contained 
"epochs" is fraught with danger, especially insofar as it can serve as 
a way to quietly suggest that past approaches to problems are 
"transcended" by "history" and lose all relevance for the future. 
In the space remaining I wish to draw attention to three 
important but neglected areas of study: biography, the relationship 
of political and intellectual history to economic history, and the 
subject of progressive (or "neo") liberalism. 
Perhaps most striking of all in this connection is the slight 
attention paid to biographical research on Austrian liberals, either 
as individuals or as a group. Broad generalizations about 
"liberalism" and the group psychology and behavior of "the 
liberals"abound, but we really know remarkably little in detail 
about individual liberals - their life histories, personalities, and 
unique sensibilities. Even in Austria it is difficult to find recent 
biographical studies. In some instances this situation may be 
attributed to a lack of documentation, but in many cases it simply 
reflects the fact that archives and libraries have not been combed 
with a view to liberal biography. 
In the late 1970s, for example, the Austrian National Library's 
subject catalog for the period since 1931 listed one article reprint on 
the federalist Adolf Fischhof, one dissertation each on the editor 
Moritz Benedikt, the parliamentary leader Eduard Herbst, and the 
historian Richard Charmatz, one article reprint on Joseph Redlich, 
and nothing at all on Ernst von Plener. The case of so well-known a 
figure as Anton von Schmerling is especially interesting. 
Schmerling's Nachlass has been housed in the Austrian state 
archives since the late 1930s, yet so far as I can determine it has been 
the basis for only one 59-page biographical essay by Paul Molisch23 
22. E.g., Erich Zollner, Geschichte Osterreichs von den Anfingen bis zur 
Gegenwart, 4th ed. (Vienna, 1970), p. 413; Fuchs, Geistige Stromungen, p.5. On the 
origins of this convention, see Walther, "Exkurs: Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus," 
pp.808-809. 
23. Paul Molisch, Anton von Schmerling und der Liberalismus in Osterreich 
(Brunn, 1944). 
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and four dissertations on special aspects of Schmerling's career - 
despite the fact that it contains Schmerling's correspondence with 
his mother during 1848 and a lengthy draft of an autobiography in 
Schmerling's own hand. 
Various reasons could be cited to explain the neglect of liberal 
biography. First, under the influence of social science methodology 
(and often with good reason) the research interests of historians in 
general have shifted way from biography narrowly conceived as 
"life history." Moreover, the liberal movement - despite the fact 
that it was led by intensely individualistic Honoratioren - 
produced no magnetic leaders who captured the popular or 
scholarly imagination. One author has aptly observed that, aside 
from some impressive tombstones and two statues honoring Mayor 
Andreas Zelinka and the geologist Eduard Suess, there are no 
public monuments dedicated to liberals in Vienna.24 It is true that 
many of the liberal leaders - e.g., Schmerling, Herbst, the younger 
Plener - strike one as cold, stiff, tactless, and unimaginative. 
Furthermore, after the eruption of popular anti-Semitism in the 
1880s, liberalism was increasingly identified as a "Jewish" ideology. 
This was of enormous significance, not only for the fortunes of 
liberalism as a political movement (culminating in the miserable 
showing of the "Biirgerlich-Demokratische Partei" in 1919), but for 
historiography of liberalism as well. 
The problem can be resolved only through archival research. 
This work can be approached in various ways, and I will only make 
two suggestions in this regard. First, historians should try to 
investigate more closely not only the lives and careers of the 
liberals of Vienna, but those of other regions and cities as well: Linz, 
Graz, Brtinn, Prague, etc. In the provincial cities, liberals 
frequently exercised political power longer than in the imperial 
capital, sometimes right to the end of the Habsburg period; more 
attention to the local history of liberalism would enrich and 
counterbalance the traditional, one-sided focus on Austro-German 
liberalism as an essentially Viennese phenomenon.25 
Secondly, Namierite and sociological approaches which aim at 
24. Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 134. 
25. A scattering of relevant local studies does exist: William H. Hubbard, 
"Politics and Society in the Central European City: Graz, Austria, 1861-1918," 
Canadian Journal of History, 5 (March 1970): 25-45; Kurt Wimmer, Liberalismus in 
Ober6sterreich (Linz, 1979); Kurt Tweraser, "Der Linzer Gemeinderat 1880-1914: 
Glanz und Elend birgerlicher Herrschaft," Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Linz 
(1979): 293-341; and, most recently, Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival: 
Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (Princeton, N.J., 1981). 
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the collective political or social biography of liberals (though these 
would, in themselves, be exceedingly valuable) are unlikely to yield 
results which would cause us to question conventional 
generalizations, or go beyond the tedious ideological "unmasking" 
and tendentious linking of liberalism with "bourgeois culture" 
which is already so common. It is a fact that, politically, the mid and 
late-nineteenth century liberals fell dramatically from grace and 
that, socially, their mainstream views were overwhelmed by new, 
more populist and democratic attitudes. Few would disagree that 
"By the turn of the century, liberalism had been pushed to the 
fringes of the political scene, seriously weakened by its own 
divisions and ambiguities," although whether one can speak of its 
"apparently irreversible alienation from the most active forces in 
German life"26 is less clear. A broader appreciation of the 
significance of liberalism in nineteenth-century life requires an 
understanding of its individual nuances and anomalies, and this 
suggests that the current methodological orthodoxy of political 
sociology, with its emphasis on the "class" character of liberal 
"ideology," should be complemented whenever possible by other 
methods, such as those of traditional intellectual history combined 
with newer techniques of rhetorical and stylistic criticism. 
Austrian archives and libraries are rich in unexploited collections 
of correspondence, unpublished memoirs, diaries, etc. A close 
reading of these private texts (along, of course, with published 
works), one concerned with the private and public rhetoric of 
liberalism - its texture, surface imagery, and metaphorical 
structure - offers a promising method for constructing the mental 
biography of liberalism, fixing the place of the liberal sensibility 
and imagination in late Habsburg history, and for helping to 
determine its meaning for future generations as well. 
A different but potentially equally rewarding field of inquiry 
concerns the question of relationships between Austrian economic 
growth, economic theory, and liberalism. Until quite recently, the 
entire field of modern Austro-Hungarian economic history was 
itself virtually "dormant."27 Traditionally, scholarly interest was 
trained on the more dramatic cases of industrialization or economic 
backwardness - Britain, America, and Bismarckian Germany on 
the one hand, tsarist Russia on the other - and historians of the 
26. James J. Sheehan, "Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth-Century 
Germany," Past and Present, 51 (May 1971): 116. 
27. N.T. Gross, The Industrial Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1750-1914 
(London, 1972), p. 12 (reprinted from Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic 
History of Europe, vol. 4: pp. 228-278). 
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Austrian economy were largely content to adapt their data to 
general theoretical frameworks, particularly the widely held 
notion of a "great depression" in Europe between 1873 and 1896.28 
The key event in this cataclysmic configuration of events is the 
Vienna stock market crash of 1873. In Austrian historiography, the 
great Krach carries a heavy load of symbolism; almost universally, 
it is represented as having shaken "middle-class society" - and its 
liberal political leadership - to the roots, and it is conventionally 
used as a device to signify the onset of liberalism's demise. 
The practice of unreflectively invoking the "great depression" 
thesis as a ready-made device for explaining liberalism's "decline" 
has become so commonplace as to arouse a certain measure of 
skepticism. What if there were no "great depression?" In the case of 
Britain, it has in fact been argued that the idea is a myth,29 and 
Alexander Gerschenkron has called the idea "dubious" for 
Germany as well.30 Recently, an alternative school of thought in 
Austrian economic history - "analytical" as opposed to 
"descriptive" - has arisen. The approach rests on often 
controversial quantitative methods and its adherents warn that 
their findings are tentative.31 Nevertheless, they have seriously 
challenged the notion that nineteenth-century Habsburg economic 
development was essentially characterized by dramatic booms and 
busts, and some have specifically questioned the idea of a "great 
depression" in Austria. One scholar states flatly: "Austria does not 
seem to have suffered a long depression in the 23 years after the 
crash of 1873.... in terms of the behavior of real output, the 'great 
depression' in Austria, as in England, is essentially a myth."32 
What are the implications of this position for our understanding 
28. For central Europe, Hans Rosenberg has been the most important 
popularizer of the "great depression" thesis: see note 13. 
29. S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression, 1873-1896 (London, 1969). 
30. "The Great Depression in Germany," in Alexander Gerschenkron, 
Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 406 
31. For a bibliography of the recent work, as well as some of the more important 
older studies, see Richard L. Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization in Austria- 
Hungary: The Role of Banks in the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873- 
1914 (Cambridge, 1976), p. 233, n. 3. Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, 1: Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Vienna, 
1973) presents both traditional and more recent points of view. 
32. David F. Good, "Stagnation and 'Take-Off' in Austria, 1873-1913," The 
Economic History Review, second series, 27 (1974): 83. See also chapters one (on 
Germany) and five (on Austria-Hungary) of Alan S. Milward and S.B. Saul, The 
Development of the Economies of Continental Europe, 1850-1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1977); also Nipperdey, "Wehler's 'Kaiserreich'," p. 556, who notes a tendency for the 
"great depression" thesis to become a fast allerkliirenden Mythos. 
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of Austrian liberalism and, indeed, for our general attitudes toward 
late nineteenth-century Austrian political history as a whole? This 
is a complex problem which requires careful research and 
reflection. Even if the econometric thesis proves ultimately 
convincing, we cannot overlook the fact that market fluctuations, 
financial scandals, etc., were widely perceived in a traumatic way, 
and that this perception contributed to disillusionment with 
liberalism and a climate of cynicism or indifference toward rational 
politics in general; the testimony of the contemporary press, 
periodicals, pamphlet literature, and private papers is simply 
undeniable on this score. On the other hand, it may be that one of 
the reasons for the popularity of the "great depression" theory is 
that it has served so well the students of "cultural despair" and anti- 
Semitism who are really interested in the roots of National 
Socialism, and not primarily in the late nineteenth century itself. 
Moreover, in recent years the influence of Marxian theory has been 
so pervasive that even the most superficial accounts of the "decline 
and fall" of the old order in central Europe have at least had to bow 
melodramatically in the direction of economic "crisis." It may 
prove that this has led to an exaggerated emphasis on the weakness 
of liberalism as an idea, if not as a political movement, in the late 
nineteenth century. 
One suspects that the "great depression" paradigm is to some 
extent a backward projection of the personal experience of its 
disseminators during the "great depression" of the 1930s, which is 
also regularly explained as a "crisis" of liberalism. Coincidentally, 
in both the 1870s and the 1930s the onset of "crisis" was signaled by a 
Viennese crash. Rosenberg, it should be noted, displays a 
propensity for finding "great depressions" in the German past - as 
far back as the early seventeenth century.33 
Beyond this is an area of Austrian economic and intellectual 
history which is especially noteworthy for the lack of interest it has 
aroused among historians: the "Austrian School" of economic 
theory associated with Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser, and 
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, and its specific relationship to the late 
nineteenth-century context. Though its doctrines were influential 
and widely debated in the first three decades of this century, 
careful study of this school - with its emphasis on the heroic role of 
the individual entrepreneur - has had very low marginal utility 
for the majority of scholars since the 1930s. Friedrich von Hayek's 
33. See Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The 
Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (1958; reprint ed., Boston, 1966), pp. 33, 59. 
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roots in this tradition are, of course, acknowledged, and there is a 
cult of "free enterprisers" and libertarians in the United States who 
are enthusiasts for the doctrines of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, and 
especially Ludwig von Mises. Even they, however, have not done 
much to shed light on the historical origins and significance of the 
doctrine - partly because the father of the school, Menger himself, 
disdained "historicism," partly due to their own lack of interest in 
historical explanation. In Austria itself, the current cimate of neo- 
liberal/social democratic opinion has not been conducive to 
historical interest in Menger's ideas.34 
Here, indeed, is a virtual historiographical vacuum. How, 
specifically, are the school's idea of marginal utility, its deductive, 
Aristotelian method, its opposition to "historicism," its theory of 
the business cycle, and its generally subjectivist approach to life 
related to the broader Austrian scene? Once again, basic 
intellectual biography would seem to be a logical first step. A 
concerted attempt should be made to relate the lives and ideas of 
the Austrian masters, and their lesser disciples such as 
Philoppovich, to the currents of late nineteenth-century political 
and cultural life: "classical" liberalism, as well as progressive neo- 
liberalism and revisionist social democracy; generational conflict; 
the sense of undirected flux which preoccupied the German- 
speaking intelligentsia; upper-middle class aestheticism and status 
envy for the aristocracy; status anxiety vis-a-vis the masses; the 
intelligentsia's melancholy, adolescent obsession with the theme of 
arrested growth; the fashionable rhetoric of decline and the 
iconography of threatened masculinity which surfaced so often in 
literature and the fine arts, and which permeates private records as 
well.35 
34. See the remarks of F.A. Hayek, "The Place of Menger's Grundsdtze in the 
History of Economic Thought," in J.R. Hicks and W. Weber, eds., Carl Menger and 
the Austrian School of Economics (Oxford, 1973), pp. 4-5. Also Murray N. Rothbard, 
"New Light on the Prehistory of the Austrian School," in Edwin G. Dolan, ed., The 
Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics (Kansas City, 1976), pp. 52-74; Emil 
Kauder, A History of Marginal Utility Theory (Princeton, N.J., 1965) and 
"Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School," Zeitschrift fur 
Nationalokonomie, 17 (December 1957): 411-425. For general bibliography, see 
Hayek's article on the "Austrian School" in the International Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences and the references in Wiliam M. Johnston's The Austrian Mind (Berkeley, 
1973) and R.S. Howey's The Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-1889 (Lawrence, 
Kansas, 1960). 
35. For some sketchy, impressionistic thoughts along these lines, see Erich 
Streissler, "Structural Economic Thought: On The Significance of the Austrian 
School Today," Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 29 (December 1969): 237-266, 
especially pp. 256-260. 
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Finally, I would like to draw attention to one last topic which 
has been traditionally overlooked: progressivism, or "neo- 
liberalism" (Neuliberalismus). In their rush to dispense with 
liberalism and advance to the subjects of political extremism, 
irrationalism, and expressionism, historians of central Europe have 
tended to reduce turn-of-the-century liberalism to an autumnal 
Geisteshaltung of melancholy Kulturliberalismus, or, at best, to 
represent it as a derivative "post-liberal" echo of an allegedly alien 
west European reformism. They seem to have been willing to agree 
with Mussolini that liberalism was "no more than a parenthesis" in 
central European history.36 This point of view may have appeared 
compelling in the 1930s and 1940s, when fascism and communism 
seemed to many people to provide the chief political and economic 
alternatives of the twentieth century. It should seem less 
convincing today, however, at a time when revisionist liberalism is 
the working philosophy of the west European and North American 
welfare state, all intellectually chic references to the "bankruptcy" 
of liberalism notwithstanding. Much of the confusion results from 
the simple fact that all too often the authors of liberalism's obituary 
are really talking about the "classical liberalism" of a generation of 
liberals - usually that of the 1860s and 1870s - and not about the 
evolving and continuing tradition of liberalism itself. Speaking of 
the situation in Britain, where similar problems of interpretation 
exist, one scholar has noted: 
Modern liberalism has suffered mainly through sheer 
ignorance of its nature. Even now, many of its modern 
opponents assail with venom a set of principles that liberalism 
itself discarded almost a century ago.... the underestimation of 
liberalism appears to be the result of equating it with the 
Liberal party, of an aversion to considering ideology outside 
the aegis of party, and of a fixation with the mid-century 
liberalism of the utilitarians. . . . condemning liberalism by 
relating it to its earlier prototype was a crude method of anti- 
liberal propaganda used by its opponents at the turn of the 
century, but later transformed into a myth not refuted by 
scholarship.37 
36. Benito Mussolini, "The Doctrine of Fascism," in John Louis Beatty and 
Oliver A. Johnson, eds., Heritage of Western Civilization, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1977), vol 2: p. 337. 
37. Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism, pp. 1, 255. As for the association of 
laissez-faire economics and liberalism, Freeden argues (p. 23) that this was 
"transient." Freeden's discussion of the essential and ephemeral elements of the 
British liberal tradition on pp. 22-23 might well be extended to the western liberal 
tradition as a whole. 
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At present, it seems reasonable to entertain the idea that pre- 
1914 revisionist liberalism in Austria - like progressive liberalism 
elsewhere - represents a prelude rather than a climax, a glimmer 
of the neo-liberal/social democratic future rather than a quixotic 
effort to resuscitate the corpse of a dead ideology. At the very least, 
progressivism deserves to be rescued from posterity's 
condescension and recognized as an important undercurrent 
in the intellectual and political history of Austria on the eve of 
World War I.38 
This viewpoint is, in fact, beginning to win modest support. 
Such recent books as Ingrid Belke's study of Josef Popper,39 and 
especially Eva Holleis' brief survey of Viennese Fabianism and the 
Sozialpolitsche Partei,40 highlight turn-of-the-century efforts to 
revise liberal doctrine to meet the demands of industrial society 
and democratic politics, and suggest that neo-liberal projects may 
have been something more than "poignant examples of hope's 
triumph over experience" in central Europe.41 
Actually, one suspects that Austrian liberalism - even in its 
"classical" and "national liberal" guises - was never quite so rigid 
or socially obtuse as it is regularly made out to have been. Karl 
Giskra's infamous remark about the social question stopping "at 
Bodenbach" was perhaps more exceptional in its callousness than 
genuinely representative of liberal opinion. Heinrich Friedjung, 
the famous historian, is a good example of a liberal who is seldom 
associated with enlightened social views. In point of fact, Friedjung 
was a perceptive sociocultural historian, as the second volume of his 
unfinished Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860 testifies. He began his 
political career as a populist and, as editor of the Deutsche 
38. One of the few American studies to address the subject in Austria, even in 
passing, is John W. Boyer, "Freud, Marriage, and Late Viennese Liberalism: A 
Commentary from 1905," The Journal of Modern History, 50 (March 1978): 72-102, 
especially pp. 73-91. It, too, views progressivism in terms of "post-liberal bourgeois 
culture" (p.77). Boyer's reference to "the destruction of [Vienna's] German Liberal 
tradition" by 1895 (Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna, p. ix), is only 
justified in party political terms. 
39. Ingrid Belke, Die sozialreformischen Ideen von Josef Popper-Lynkeus 
(1838-1921) in Zusammenhang mit allgemeinen Reformbestrebungen des Wiener 
Biurgertums um die Jahrhundertwende (Tiibingen, 1979). 
40. Eva Holleis, Die Sozialpolitische Partei: Sozialliberale Bestrebungen in 
Wien um die Jahhundertwende (Munich, 1978). 
41. Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 258. American critics have not thus far 
been impressed by the possible merits of this approach. See the unenthusiastic 
review of Holleis by William H. Hubbard, The American Historical Review, 85 
(December 1979): 1421-1422. 
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Wochenschrift in the 1880s, he consistently devoted a large amount 
of space to social issues. As a liberal city councilor in Vienna in the 
early 1890s, he defended social reform, and was a member of the 
Viennese Fabian Society. 
Other examples could be cited, such as the efforts of Richard 
Charmatz and the circle around the short-lived periodical Der Weg 
to encourage industrialization and foster a "neo-liberal" political 
alliance of progressives and revisionist social democrats.42 Such 
efforts, it is true, enjoyed at best modest political success; in 
quantitative terms - the hard facts and figures and calculated 
"results" at the political ledger's "bottom line" - their practical 
achievements before 1914 do not amount to a great deal. In terms of 
the history of ideas and human sentiment, however, they are not 
unimportant. Moreover, Holleis has correctly assessed their long- 
term political significance for the twentieth century: 
In the more distant future, the ideas and methods of the 
Sozialpolitiker proved themselves - at least in the western 
world - politically more effective than the Marxist, Christian, 
or nationalist ideologies. The fact is often overlooked that the 
social welfare state established in the west after 1945 rests on 
the theory and practice of liberal economists who have worked 
since the 1870s.... 
Whoever looks for the roots of the Austrian welfare state 
will inevitably encounter the social-political movement at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The ideas of the Sozialpolitiker, 
their notions of a liberal welfare state, have been realized today 
in almost all the states of the western world.43 
In conclusion, there may indeed be genuinely sound reasons 
for contriving the history of late nineteenth-century Austrian 
liberalism in ironic terms: the existence of a tension, for example, 
between the oft-encountered liberal emphasis on "manliness" as 
an expression of independence and self-reliance, and many 
individual liberals' characteristic self-pity and debilitating sense of 
inferiority in the face of an ideal of baroque aristocratic grace which 
the liberal imagination itself had done much to invent. The notion 
of the "death" of liberalism at the turn-of-the-century, however, is 
42. Charmatz, Deutsch-Osterreichische Politik, pp. 7-9, 239, 305-306, 308, 324. A 
broad range of other examples can be found in Belke, Die sozialreformischen Ideen. 
43. Holleis, Die Sozialpolitische Partei, pp. 107, 112. Freeden's remarks 
concerning Britain in The New Liberalism, p. 1, are similar in tone. For Germany, cf. 
Zmarzlik, "Das Kaiserreich in neuer Sicht?" pp. 69-70; also Nipperdey, "Wehler's 
'Kaiserreich'," pp. 543-545, 554-555. 
247 
This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:40:42 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
248 GERMAN STUDIES REVIEW 
not one of them. In this respect, it perhaps is often not so much the 
liberals themselves as some of their historians who should be 
viewed ironically. If, after having reconsidered the subject of late 
nineteenth-century Austrian liberalism, it proves impossible to 
imagine its history in the reconciliatory terms of high comedy, it 
may at least be possible to avoid the teleological cliches of specious 
"tragedy," the pathos of middlebrow journalism, and the conceit of 
glib irony. 
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